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1. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of the evaluation literature of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs), which is vast 
and is becoming technically sophisticated, is traditionally the evaluation of a single programme. 
However, stimulated by the work of Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2001), who extended the matching 
methodology for a single treatment - under the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) – to the 
case of multiple treatments, the evaluation literature of labour programmes is being extended to the 
evaluation of the set of programmes that are running simultaneously in a particular labour market. 
 The traditional microeconometric evaluation literature, where the subject of the evaluation is 
the participation (or not) of individuals in a particular programme – that is in a exclusive treatment – 
does not capture the reality of active public interventions in the European labour markets characterized 
by the heterogeneity of ongoing programmes that are available for the universe of potential participants 
in ALMPs. 
The Portuguese labour market is an example of an institutional framework where several 
ongoing active labour market programmes are available for those unemployed individuals who register 
in the public employment service looking for an employment solution. So, the evaluation of the labour 
programmes offered to the unemployed, independently of each other, could not explain satisfactorily 
the effect of the public intervention in the labour market for the registered Portuguese unemployed. A 
comprehensive microeconometric evaluation of the Portuguese ALMPs is a way to understand fully the 
effect of the public intervention on those who are unemployed and are potentially eligible to participate 
in the full range of programmes offered.  
Indeed this is the major contribution of our present work. In Portugal we do not know any 
work which addresses a comprehensive evaluation of the active labour market policy in a multiple 
treatment context and even in the international literature those kind of empirical studies are not very 
common. Still our work will follow some international empirical applications of the matching estimator 
for a multiple treatment context proposed by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001). Mainly, we will have 
as reference the work by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) since the authors evaluated the active labour 
market policy adopted in Switzerland, which described labour market institutional framework as very 
similar to the Portuguese one, using an administrative database as we intend to. However other 
evaluation applications can be referred. Brodaty et al. (2001) evaluated, for the period 1986-1988 and 
using administrative data, the effects  of youth employment programmes that were set up in France to 
improve the labour market prospects of the most disadvantaged and unskilled young workers. Also for 
a youth population, Larsson (2003) evaluated, jointly, the effects on the employment of two Swedish 
active programmes and Dorsett (2001) evaluated the relative effectiveness of the New Deal’s option in 
reducing the male youth unemployment in the United Kingdom. 
As with the above international empirical evaluations, we will use administrative data. Our study 
uses the administrative records of Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP) – the Portuguese 
public employment service – to assess the effectiveness of the Portuguese active labour market policy 
in the improvement of the employability of participants. The raw dataset contains the individual 
records collected by all local offices of IEFP. It includes a substantial number of individual labour 
market characteristics and, in particular, very detailed information on participation in a set of ALMPs 
over a period of six years (1998-2003). 
Also like the above referred empirical applications we will use a matching methodology but, 
unlike those works, we will extend the econometric multiple treatment evaluation framework to apply a 
nonparametric conditional difference-in-differences methodology. This approach combines propensity 
score matching techniques with the conventional difference-in-differences estimation, to construct the 
relevant counterfactual under the hypothesis of selection on observables and on unobservables. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the Portuguese institutional 
context for the active labour market policy and the programmes we will evaluate. Section 3 presents the 
microeconometric framework to a multiple treatment evaluation. The dataset and the modelling 
strategy are described in Section 4 followed by Section 5 where the empirical analysis of participation 
on one of the selected treatment states is discussed and Section 6 where the matching procedure is 
presented. Results from the selected econometric conditional difference-in-differences methodology are 
reported in Section 7.  
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2. - PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
2.1 - Institutional Context 
The Portuguese ALMP, like the ones evaluated by the papers referred to above, are applied through 
a wide range of different programmes which we aggregate in five different major groups of intervention 
like the areas of intervention identified by the Portuguese public service: (i) Direct Placement, (ii) Job 
Counselling, (iii) Employment Programmes, (iv) Training Programmes, and (v) Professional 
Rehabilitation Programmes designed, specifically, to disabled individuals. 
Some of these major groups of intervention, like the group of Employment programmes or the 
group of Training Programmes, comprise ample sort of heterogeneous programmes. So, the major 
division presented above can be further divided in some main aggregation of programmes that share 
general characteristics, aims and are addressed to the same individuals. 
 In practice, the set of distinct operational programmes of ALMP is wide, sometimes running 
continuously over time, and are potentially available for all the recorded unemployed individuals. On 
the other hand, the individuals can be recorded repeatedly (and the data show they actually are) having 
the right to participate in different periods of time and in different patterns in their observed 
unemployment spell. 
After the participation in a programme, there are several destination states for the participant. 
However, the main objective of the Portuguese ALMPs is to improve the (re)employability of the 
unemployed recorded individuals and so employment (including self-employment) represents the main 
policy outcome.  
 Although this institutional framework does not fit into a standard traditional evaluation process, 
where a programme is administered at a fixed point in time and where it is easier to distinguish the 
individuals by their participation, or no participation at all, in the programme, this is an institutional 
framework commonly found, in practice, in the European economies (see, for instance, Sianesi, 2004) 
where one has ongoing programmes and any unemployed individual can potentially become a 
participant. 
 
2.2 – Treatment States 
The major group of Employment Programmes can be divided into (i) Training/Employment 
Programmes, (ii) Private Employment Incentives for those who want to create their own employment 
and (iii) the Social Employment Market (which includes, as the key group of programmes, the Public 
Employment Programmes). Concerning the Training Programmes it is important to make a distinction 
between two main groups: (i) the vocational training and (ii) the professional training programmes 
(which we will call basic training, since is an international recognized designation for this kind of 
training)1. 
We will compare the above mentioned programmes among them and also with the absence of 
participation in any ALMP. So, we will consider six different states of participation, which we will call 
treatment states and we will identify them by the initials to help the reading: 1) No participation (NP); 
2) Direct Placement (DP); 3) Job counselling (JC); 4) Training/Employment (TE); 5) Social 
Employment Market, which we will associate with the Public Employment Programmes since these 
programmes are the ones which collected almost all the participants in Social Employment Market 
Programmes (PEP); and, 6) Basic training (BT). 
The NP treatment state will be defined as the treatment state where a participation in any of the 
programmes offered by the public employment service is not observable. 
The DP treatment state is considered in this analysis as a treatment state since it is one of the major 
groups of intervention identified by the Portuguese public employment service and because, although it 
is not a real active labour market programme, the register individual benefits from the active efforts of 
the public employment service to match the supply and demand for a job. Indeed in the Portuguese 
institutional context even the non-participants are, in some way, “treated” because, since the moment 
they register in a public employment office, they can benefit – even if they do not – from the available 
                                                          
1 In our work we will not consider the Private Employment Incentives and the vocational training programmes since 
their specificity creates practical problems of comparability. 
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general services like counselling, guidance or placement. To participate in the DP treatment state only 
requires registration in the public employment service as the participation in the JC treatment state. 
 The JC treatment state consists of technical services offered by the public employment service 
aiming to support the development of programmes of active and organised employment demand by the 
registered unemployed individuals. These technical services intend namely to promote the acquisition 
of effective job demand skills like the ability to find and explore labour market opportunities, the ability 
to present an appealing CV and cover letter or the capability to represent themselves at a job interview. 
In short we can define the JC programmes as programmes which promote the self-knowledge of labour 
skills to enable an easier (re) admission and ability to fit in the labour market. 
 TE programmes are characterized by the offer of training to registered unemployed individuals 
(looking for a first employment or with former employment experiences) and, simultaneously, by 
allowing the contact with a real labour market experience. The ultimate goal of the TE treatment state 
is to increase the opportunities of labour marker (re)absorption. Among theses programmes we can 
find programmes for individuals with different levels of education but all of them are directed at 
unemployed individuals registered in a public employment office and have a maximum duration of one 
year. 
PEPs, best known in Portugal as Programas Ocupacionais, are mainly targeted to unemployed 
individuals in families with a per capita monthly income lower than the national minimum wage and to 
unemployment beneficiaries. Participants in these programmes are required to perform non market-
oriented activities (i.e. activities which do not directly compete with existing labour market vacancies). 
Although participation is not intended to exceed a maximum of twelve months, renewals with the same 
maximum duration are frequent. Any job or vocational training offered by the public employment 
service prevails over participation in Programas Ocupacionais. A refusal immediately ends entitlement to 
unemployment benefits and other income support schemes. In addition, participants must be involved 
in active and confirmed job searching for which they have a free day per week. 
 To conclude, among the BT Programmes it is possible to find a large extension of different 
programmes with particular characteristics. However all of them share the same type of beneficiaries – 
unemployed individuals with no, insufficient or non-adequate labour market qualifications concerning 
the needs of the labour market2 – and possess a duration that does not exceed one year. 
 The selected treatment states present differences and could be classified as heterogeneous. 
Indeed we admit that they are not strictly comparable but we argue that they share features which make 
their comparability not only possible but also very interesting to assess the performance of the active 
labour market policy in the Portuguese labour market.  
Our arguments are: (i) all the treatment states are potentially available for all the registered 
individuals; (ii) all of the selected treatment states, except the NP treatment state, involve a participation 
period which does not exceed one year of duration; (iii) the characteristics, which could decide the 
entry on a particular treatment state according to the legislation regulating the programmes, are 
observable characteristics captured by the administrative data – the educational level of the registered 
individual in one example – and; (iv) the aim of all the treatment states, again with the exception of the 
NP treatment state which does not have a particular aim, is to improve the employability of the 
unemployed participants. 
 So assuming six heterogeneous, but comparable, treatment effects we will present a 
comprehensive empirical evaluation of the Portuguese public active intervention on the labour market 
within a multiple treatment econometric framework. 
 
 
3. - FRAMEWORK TO THE CAUSAL EVALUATION MODEL WITH MULTIPLE TREATMENTS 
To evaluate the Portuguese active labour market policy, assuming the coexistence of 
heterogeneous multiple treatments for the registered unemployed individuals, we will apply the 
extension of Imbens(2000) and Lechner(2001) to the Rubin (1974) model of causality with a binary 
treatment framework. 
                                                          
2 Some of the basic training courses have also employed individuals as beneficiaries but they are not considered in the 
database used in the empirical application. 
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Following the notation of Lechner (2001) let us assume that a random individual, i , could 
participated in ( )1+M  mutually exclusive treatments, denoted by M,...,1,0 3. The participation in 
treatment m  is indicated by { }MD ,...,1,0= . The potential results, associated with this ( )1+M  
possible treatments, will be defined by { }MYYY ,...,, 10 . The number of observations in the population 
is N , such that ∑
=
=
M
m
mNN
0
, where mN  is the number of participants in treatment N. For each 
participant individual only one component of the defined outcomes is observable being the others, M , 
the counterfactuals never observed. Under certain assumptions could be identified average causal 
effects of the treatment, though. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the parameter 
which receives more attention in the binary evaluation literature and is the typically estimated treatment 
effect in empirical evaluations (Lechner, 2002). For the multi-treatment version this parameter could be 
presented as a pairwise comparison of the effects of the treatments m  and l  for the participants in 
treatment m , this is: ( ) ( ) ( )mDYEmDYEmDYYEATT lmlmlm =−===−=, , (1) 
where lmATT ,  is the expected treatment effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of 
participants in treatment m , comparing with treatment l .  
The question is that the traditional model of causality (Rubin, 1974) assumes that in a non-
experimental evaluation process it is not possible to identify the average causal effect of a treatment and 
so the identification of that effect must rely on strong, but normally non-testable, assumptions which 
plausibility should be argued case by case depending on the underlined economic problem and the 
available data. The extension of the traditional model of causality to the case of a multiple treatment 
context assumes the same problem and adopts the same most common assumption, the conditional 
independence assumption – CIA (or “strong uncounfoudness” as it as been called by Imbens, 2000). 
Under the multiple treatment context the CIA can be formalised as follow: { } χ∈∀=⊥ xxXDYYY M ,,...,, 10  (2) 
This is, all potential treatment outcomes are independent of the selection mechanism for any given 
value of a vector of characteristics,X , in a characteristic space, χ  (Lechner, 2002a). This means that 
the researcher observes all the characteristics, X , which jointly influence the participation on a 
particular treatment and the consequently potential outcomes. 
 Additionally, the identification of the average causal effect requires that all individuals actually 
have the possibility of participation in all the alternative states of treatment, this is, it is required a 
support condition: ( )χ∈∀=∀==< xMmxXmDP ,,...,0,0  (3) 
Since conditioning on all relevant observable characteristics could cause a problem of 
dimensionality, Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) show that the properties of the particular balancing 
score, the propensity score, suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to overcome the “curse of 
dimensionality” also hold for the multiple treatment case. So, using the probability of participation in a 
treatment conditional on the observable characteristics, the lmATT ,  can be presented as ( ) ( )[ ]{ }mDlDXPYEEmDYEATT mlll
P
mlm
mll
==−==  ,, , (4) 
where ( )xP mll,  is the conditional choice probability of a treatment given either treatment m  or l , this is: 
( ) { }( ) ( )( ) ( )xPxP xPxXmlDlDPxP ml
l
mllmll
+==∈== ,,  (5) 
The lmATT ,  parameter is now identified from an infinitely large random sample because all 
participation probabilities, as well as ( )mDYE m =  and ( )lDXPYE mlll =),(  are identified (Lechner, 
2002a). 
                                                          
3 Generally, treatment 0  denotes the absence of participation in some kind of policy (treatment). 
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These results allow us to apply in the multiple-treatment context the appealing nonparametric 
propensity score matching methodology. A methodology not dependent of any functional form 
assumption and that allow us to correct two of the three important evaluation biases identified by 
Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). Indeed, the matching methodology eliminates the bias due to a different 
support of the vector of characteristics X (that is, the violation of the common support condition 
resulting from having a different range of X for treated and non-treated individuals) and the bias due to 
a different distribution of characteristics X over the region of common support. But, it does not 
however eliminate the third source of selectivity bias: the “selection on unobservables”, or the bias 
arising from unobserved heterogeneity among potential participants, being the acceptance of the CIA 
very dependent of the richness of the available data. 
The assumption that selection is driven only by observable characteristics is of course highly 
restrictive. For instance, some unobservable characteristics such as motivational differences across 
registered individuals, while known by public employment officers, are likely not to be observed by a 
researcher with no full access to the raw information. The implication is that the administrative data is 
likely to be insufficiently informative to make the CIA an acceptable assumption and in that case the 
presence of selection based on unobservable variables cannot be excluded. Admitting this could be the 
case of our present evaluation process we decide to extend the work of Imbens (1999) and Lechner 
(2001) a little further and apply, in the multi-treatment context, the Heckman et al (1997) proposal to 
eliminate the selection on unobservables. 
Indeed, to eliminate the selection on unobservables, Heckman et al. (1997) proposed an 
extension of the difference-in-differences approach in which the behaviour of the treatment and 
comparison groups are compared in two moments in time. Since the control group is constructed using 
matching techniques, this approach is known as conditional difference-in-differences (CDiD) to 
distinguish from the standard difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. 
The CDiD estimator assumes the Bias Stability Assumption (BSA) (Heckman et al., 1997), this 
is, that selection on unobservables is constant over time. It assumes, in particular, that the treatment 
has no impact in pre-treatment outcomes and therefore any observed difference in the pre-treatment 
period between participants and non-participants can be used to correct the observed differences in 
post-treatment outcomes.  
Under BSA, and denoting t  and 't  as the time periods after and before the programme, 
respectively, ATTMt∆  as the matching estimator for the effect of participation at time t and ATTMt '∆  as the 
matching estimator at time 't , the effect of treatment on the treated is then given by: 
ATT
Mt
ATT
Mt
ATT
CDiD '∆−∆=∆  (6)
Since we assume that everything not observable is constant over time, by differentiating twice 
over treated and non-treated individuals and before and after the event, one gets rid of the 
unobservable component present in both groups.  
 
 
4 - DATA  
With the empirical evaluation carried out by this paper we pretend to assess the impact of the 
Portuguese Active Labour Market Policy on the participants in the main different ongoing programmes 
considering a multi-treatment framework. For that purpose, the paper’s empirical evaluation relies on a 
dataset containing secondary information built from the information system of the Instituto de Emprego e 
Formação Profissional (IEFP), the public employment service in Portugal. This consists of an 
administrative dataset containing relevant information, as individual and labour market characteristics, 
related to all the individuals who had been registered by the public employment service. These records 
allow us to follow the registered labour history, including the participation on each ALMP and all 
(de)registration dates, normally connected to the reasons for it, on a monthly basis4. 
                                                          
4 The knowledge of all the registration and de-registration dates is an important issue because they allow us to understand 
the path of participation during the time period recorded by the public employment service. For instance, a registered 
individual recorded by IEFP as open unemployed, can change his labour market status due to the participation on an ALMP 
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The primary information is not suitable for scientific purposes, though. Since its main purpose 
is to be used in an administrative context, it became necessary to prepare the data in a way that makes 
possible its application in the econometric context discussed above. The construction of an 
identification variable, taking advantage of the existence of two original identification variables – for the 
individual and for the unemployment office – allow us to follow the individuals over their recorded 
labour history and, consequently, allow us to include the time component. Still the available data 
containing information about all the registered individuals in the period between January 1998 and 
December 2003 results in a dataset with a dimension difficult to deal with. Because it is not feasible to 
work with all these individuals the dimension obstacle was overcome using only part of the total 
amount of registered individuals during the above mentioned time period. 
The sample population considered on this paper corresponds to all the individuals registered as 
unemployed at the beginning of January 2001 and who never participated in an ALPM before that 
period or will ever participate in another one after the analysed participation in one of the interest 
programmes. These restrictions to the sample construction try to avoid the contamination of the results 
for previous or subsequent participation in some kind of public employment programmes, which could 
lead to questions of sequential treatments which are not addressed by the present work. 
The sample is further restricted to individuals aged between 16 and 60 years old to avoid bias 
caused by the legal impossibility to work and the abandon of the labour force due to retirement 
reasons, respectively. Apart from this age requirement only observations of those who change their 
register from one public employment office to another, were abandoned since data limitations do not 
allow us to follow them. 
The interested unemployed population is then divided into different treatment sub-samples – 
which we will call treatment states –, according to the participation in a particular active programme, 
between January and December 2001, or the non-participation in any of the considered programmes5. 
Thus the treated individuals includes all individuals that participated in one of the possible considered 
treatment states between the period t’ and t, with t’ and t denoting points in time corresponding to 
periods of time before and after a particular treatment state participation, respectively. 
The average treatment effect will be computed comparing the effects of participation in a 
particular programme with the participation in each of the other programmes and the non-participation 
case, that is, the outcome resulting of a participation in a treatment state will be compared with the 
outcome obtained by the alternative participation in each of the other treatment states. 
The unemployment register at specific periods, t, after participation will be assumed as the 
outcome variable within our evaluation process. A positive average treatment effect on the treated will 
represent the maintenance of an unemployment register so it should then be considered as a failure of 
the programme, since the main official aim of the Portuguese active labour market policy is to help the 
unemployed individuals to find a regular employment6.  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION ON A TREATMENT STATE 
 
5.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
The propensity score matching literature supports the view that observable variables that might 
influence the decision of participation in one of the selected treatment states, as well as future potential 
employment outcomes, should be included in the conditioning set of characteristics, X, and, therefore, 
in the estimation of the propensity score for participation to avoid biased estimates of the causal 
effects. If we can include these available variables the question will be whether such important variables 
as motivation, ability or social contacts are missing so, the interest of applying a conditional difference-
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and become again openly unemployed before permanently, or just temporarily, de-registering due to a transition to a labour 
market status characterised by a regular employment. 
5 A non-participant is defined as a registered unemployed individual who has never been enrolled in any ALMP. However 
since we considered the non-participation as another treatment state, we will refer to all individuals as treated individuals. 
6 Other outcome variables, like wages for instance, could provide increased interest within an evaluation process but 
difficulties concerning the data source do not allow us to choose other feasible outcome variable. 
 7
in-differences estimator will be to try to capture the effect of these unobservable characteristics on the 
participants’ results. 
 There is no algorithm to choose the set of characteristics X to include in the model used to 
estimate the propensity score and the economic theory – and, in this case, the nature of the institutional 
database – does not provide much guidance on how to choose it. For our empirical analysis were 
chosen, as factors that could be potentially important, socio-demographic variables like sex, age, 
regional location or the responsibility for others; qualification variables like the educational level, the 
previous occupational group, the qualification rank; and, labour market variables like the reason for 
being unemployed, the unemployment category or a previous register in a public employment office. 
Details about the variables used in this paper, as well as their distribution between the treatment 
states are presented in Table 1. The predominant treatment state is undoubtedly the NP state with 
about 86% of the whole sample. Consequently only 14% of the selected unemployed population 
participated in a particular active programme during the year 2001. Among those who effectively 
participated it is important to note the participants in JC programmes – almost 8% of the whole sample 
– and the individuals directly placed in a job by the public employment service, which represent 3% of 
the sample. The remaining selected treatment states present a very similar size concerning the number 
of participants.  
The whole sample is composed, by a bigger percentage, of women, no unqualified individuals 
or those with no previous occupation, with lower levels of education and under the age of 40. 
However, Table 1 also shows that there are differences related to gender, age, geographic location of 
participants, educational levels, reasons for the unemployment register and number of registers per 
individual at the public employment service and previous occupational groups among the individuals 
distributed by the six treatment states.  
 
5.2 – Probability of Treatment State Participation 
 This section describes the results of the estimation of 2
)1( MM + , with )1( +M  the number of 
treatment states, binomial logit models for the probability of individual participation in the selected 
treatment states. The results can be found in Table 2a), Table 2b) and Table 2c). 
 Lechner (2001) discusses whether the conditional participation probabilities should be 
estimated for each combination of states separately as binary choices or whether the process should be 
modelled simultaneously with a discrete choice model including all relevant states. Both alternatives 
present advantages, namely at a practical level7. If one chooses to estimate the binomial logit models, as 
did Larsson (2004) or Dorsett (2001), it could be preferable since it avoids the restrictions associated 
with simultaneous models, namely the IIA assumption associated with the multinomial logit model. At a 
practical level, such an option could be more robust to error since a misspecification in one model will 
have fewer consequences than in the simultaneous model in which case all results will be compromised. 
Arguments in favour of a multinomial option (using, for example, a multinomial probit model as Gerfin 
and Lechner (2002) and Frolich (2004) could stand up at a practical level since there is less output to 
consider. 
 The results of binomial logit models estimated show the probability of participation in one 
treatment state, compared with the remaining ones. For example, Table 2a) shows the results of the 
probability of being in the DP treatment state compared with each one of the other options – NP, JC, 
TE, PEP and BT. 
 Given the large number of models – fifteen binomial logit models – and variables the results are 
extensive and will not be discussed. 
 Table 3 presents the number of observations in the treatment (in row) and control (in columns) 
groups, for each binomial logit model, and several tests related to the estimation of these models. With 
                                                          
7 Lechner (2001) argues that if mllP  is modelled directly no information from sub-samples other than the containing 
participants in m  and l  is needed for the identification of equation (4) and we are basically back to the context of a single 
treatment. If all values of m  and l  are of interest, the whole sample is needed for identification. In that case either the 
binomial conditional probabilities could be estimated or a structural approach, where a complete choice problem is 
formulated in one model and estimated on the full sample, could be used. 
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the more common tests, as the Pseudo- 2R , the F-test ( 2χLR , with degrees of freedom in brackets) and 
the value of the log-likelihood, we present also the correction prediction rate for participants in the 
treatment state (CPRTG). Still since the dataset provides a full range of individual characteristics, we 
looked mainly at two aspects to obtain the preferred logit specifications: i) minimization of classification 
error8; and (ii) statistical significance of the included regressors. 
 The observation of Table 2a), Table 2b) and Table 2c) allow us to verify that the majority of 
variables are statistical significant in each logit model. To illustrate, variables like sex, age, educational 
levels and the reasons for the unemployment register perform particularly well in all models. In table 3 
we can also verify that the variables in each model are jointly statistical significant. These results stress 
the findings that there are differences in the composition of the treatment states and represent a good 
indication that a matching procedure could produce effective results. Concerning the minimization of 
the classification error (Table 3) it is possible to find a within-sample correct prediction rate for 
participants in the treatment state in the 63-78% range.  
 
 
6. THE MATCHING PROCEDURE 
 Given the choice probabilities, that is, the probability of being in a particular treatment state 
compared with another of the alternative states, it is possible to perform the matching on the 
propensity score. 
For computational practical reasons, due to the dimension of the database, we chose to apply 
the nearest neighbour matching estimator, allowing the replacement of non-participant observations, 
within a common support region. This procedure is highly intuitive and not difficult to implement. It 
consists of a pairwise matching for every treated individual, obtained by choosing the closest non-
treated individual given their propensity score. Although the choice of a nearest neighbour matching 
estimator might involve an efficiency loss (for each participant, this approach uses only its closest non-
participant), it minimises the bias. The replacement option allows us to use the same non-participant 
individuals more than once if they prove to be good matches for participants. 
However, before the matching procedure, it is necessary to guarantee the common support 
condition, that is, it is necessary to ensure that the observations from two different treatment states 
could be observed having a similar participation probability. In practice, this implies that some of the 
observations at the tails outside the common support region are excluded from the analysis if the 
propensity score distributions do not cover the exact same interval. Since we estimated pairwise effects 
between each of the different six treatment states vs the remaining ones, we used the criterion that all 
estimated probabilities in the particular sub-samples are smaller than the smallest maximum and larger 
than the largest minimum – the requirement is that all observations in the treatment state m  for which 
there does not exist a comparison observation in treatment state l , ( { } lmMlm ≠∈ ,,...1,0, ), are 
removed from the sub-sample. 
 After ensuring the common support condition and before showing the results of the propensity 
score matching procedure it is also important to verify the quality of the matching procedure to balance 
the relevant characteristics, since our matching procedure is conditional on the propensity score. In 
other words, the variables included in the propensity score model should guarantee that, for a given 
propensity score, the exposure to treatment is random. Table 5 shows the results of several tests 
performed in the matching procedure to verify the quality of its results. 
The standardized bias suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), for each characteristic in 
vector X, is a suitable indicator for testing the balancing property and it has been often used in the 
evaluation literature (e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Larsson, 2004; and Dorsett, 2001). This indicator is 
defined as the difference in the mean of the two sub-samples (treated and control) as a percentage of 
                                                          
8 Minimization of classification error was suggested by Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (1999). 
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the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups.9 Due to the extension of the 
results the results for each variable are not presented. However the matching procedure achieved a 
significant reduction of the standardized differences among the variables, as it is possible to observe in 
Table 5 which presents the results for the mean standardized bias calculated as an unweighted average 
of the absolute standardized bias for each variable.  
Another balancing test applied was the t-test on differences in means between the treated and 
comparison groups before and after matching, for each variable included in the matching procedure. 
Again practical reasons do not allow us to show the results. However we can guarantee that for most of 
the variables, this test yielded significant differences before matching but not after matching, indicating 
again the capacity of the matching procedure to balance the characteristics in the treatment and the 
matched comparison treatment states. 
An alternative route, suggested by Sianesi (2004), consists of re-estimating the propensity score 
for the matched sample to compare the estimated pseudo- 2R  before and after matching. After 
matching there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between both 
groups (participants and matched non-participants). In other words, the pseudo- 2R  after matching 
should be fairly low. As Table 5 shows, this is true in our case. 
The results of the F-tests ( 2χLR , with degrees of freedom in brackets) point in the same 
direction, indicating a joint significance of all variables before but not after matching for some of the 
estimated models. 
 
 
7. RESULTS 
Our goal is to measure the causal effects of participation in one of the selected treatment states 
compared with other options, in a multiple treatment framework, in terms of the employability 
prospects of participants, both in the short and long-run. So, the effect of the programmes’ state 
participation will be measured adopting as the outcome the register in the public employment service. 
Table 5 displays the results of the matching procedure on the average treatment effect of the 
programmes on their respective participants during two and a half years after the beginning of 
participation, ATTMt∆ . The same table presents the mean differences concerning the unemployment 
register for the matched individuals before participation, ATTMt '∆ , which will be used to correct the bias 
due to selection on unobservables. 
In the context of the econometric methodology presented in section 3, we will assume that the 
true effect of a treatment state before the beginning of participation is zero, so the differences among 
the registered unemployment rates of participants in the distinct treatment states, before treatment, are 
a good estimator of the unobserved differences among treated and comparison matched individuals. 
Being the individuals selected by the public employment service to engage in a particular treatment state 
it seems difficult for an individual to anticipate the participation in a programme and thus to change 
their labour market behaviour due to a potential participation. Furthermore the programme’s target 
population are the unemployed so, in the Portuguese labour market, an individual must be registered at 
an unemployment office, as unemployed, in order to participate in the programme and it is not 
plausible that the individual abandons their labour market status, namely an employment status, to 
increase the probability of participating in a temporary occupational activity.  
The former assumption allows us to estimate the bias due to incorrectly applied conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) and if we further assume that this bias is on average identical to the t 
and t’ points in time chosen – the Bias Stability Assumption (BSA) – we can use the estimated bias to 
correct the estimate of the average effect of the treatment on the treated we get for t, assuming only the 
CIA 
                                                          
9 Standardized Bias: 
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
0011
01
XVXV
XX
+
−
, where ( )11 VX  is the mean (variance) in the treatment group and ( )00 VX  is 
the analogue for the control group.  
 10
However, still in Table 5, each 6x6 square corresponds to the matrix of the comprehensive 
programme’s effects in a selected point in time – one to five semesters (before and after the treatment). 
The programme effects are presented off the main diagonal. A positive number indicates that the effect 
on the participants of the programme shown in the column compared with the programme appearing 
in the row corresponds to a bigger amount of percentage points in the probability of being registered as 
unemployed. A negative number represents the inverse situation. 
For example, six months after the beginning of participation (time period, t=1) in a PEP the 
participants have almost 22% more probability of being registered as unemployed compared with those 
non-participants (NP state). The percentage increases to 51% compared with those in the DP state, to 
almost 55% compared with the BT state and to 70% compared to the BT state. The bigger percentage 
of unemployment registers for PEPs participants is only reduced if we compare the PEP participation 
with the JC state – the percentage of unemployment rates is still bigger for the PEP state but now the 
difference is 4%, only. These results seem to improve over time. After two and a half years, the 
participation in PEPs still compares relatively badly except when compared with the NP treatment 
state. In the long-run the PEPs participants have 3% less probability of being registered as unemployed 
than the non-participants. Regarding the other treatment states, in the long-run a bigger probability of 
being unemployed decreases substantially and remains between 5 and 10 percent points. 
On the other hand, we can find the results of the TE state. Six months after the beginning of 
participation, the average treatment effects on the treated show that the participation in TE has lower 
probabilities of having an unemployment register than all the other treatment options. The results, 
although remaining generally positive in terms of employability of TE participants, are reduced in the 
long-run and compared with the DP state the participants in the TE treatment state present a bigger 
probability of being unemployed. 
Once more the results are obviously wide and a detailed description could be unpleasant 
reading so only some general remarks will be presented. 
In the short-run PEP and JC treatment states seem to perform worse than DP, TE, BT and 
even NP treatment states. Between PEPs and JC, PEPs seems to perform the worst. The programmes 
which seem to perform better, in the short–run, are the BT and the TE, performing even better than 
the DP. We believe that the findings for the short-run, are not due directly to the performance of the 
programmes themselves but to administrative reasons – the participation in programmes like the BT 
and TE has the immediate result of unemployment’s register cancellation, which does not happen, 
obviously, in the non-participation state or in the JC programmes. Another explanation concerns the 
locking-in effects due to a lower amount of free time to look for regular employment. 
 Indeed, in the long-run the average treatment results for the treated are not so clear. However is 
interesting to point out that all the treatment states seemed to produce better results than the non-
participation treatment state, as is expected by an active labour market policy in the labour market. In a 
longer period of time the probability of having an unemployment register is lower for DP, JC, TE, PEP 
and BT treatments than for non-participants. However, among the effective participation in a particular 
active programme, the PEP is the programme that presents worse results followed by JC that performs 
only better than PEPs. In the long-run the programme that performs better is the DP – the participants 
directly placed in a job by the public employment service have a lower rate of unemployment registers 
than all the other participants in some treatment state. 
 The former analysis must be seen with careful, though. If we observe the unemployment’s 
register rates among the state’s participants before participation (this is, in time periods t=-1,-2,…,-5 in 
Table 5) we will see there are differences among participants that could, as we said above, indicate the 
existence of some unobserved heterogeneity not captured for the observed variables used to estimate 
the propensity score. 
So, to estimate the unbiased average treatment effect on the treated we used the conditional 
difference-in-differences estimator, ATTCDiD∆ , in equation (6) above. Our application of the CDiD 
methodology was made considering two approaches to estimate the register unemployment effects of 
participation. The first approach uses 't  symmetric to t, that is, given t0 – the month where the program 
begins – the outcome variable is evaluated 1, 2, …, 5 semesters before and after t0. The acronym ( )tt −='  denotes this case, for t = 1, 2,…, 5. The second approach considers 't  fixed at one semester 
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before t0 and then t equal to 1, 2, …, and 5 semesters, respectively. This case is denoted by the acronym ( )1' −=t . The results for both approaches are presented in Table 6. 
Having as reference the NP treatment state, the programmes present better results except for 
JC and PEP programmes. The explanation for the worse results of the PEPs could rest in a probable 
reduction of job search activities during participation, which can last for twelve months. The better 
results of DP, TE and BT could rest in administrative reasons – the individuals with participation in the 
last treatment states leave the unemployment register with the beginning of participation. Over time, 
however, the effects of all treatment states tend to converge and, even if the results for the t’=1 
approach are more evident, in the long run all the treatment states seem to perform better than the 
non-participation. 
 Comparing each active programme with the others and with a state of non-participation is 
possible to observe the following conclusions. 
When the DP is the reference treatment group TE and BT perform better in the short-run, only. 
The reason is probably due to the duration of the programmes. Those programmes can last for twelve 
months and their participants must leave the unemployment register during the participation time. 
Indeed if we observe the twelve months moment in time we find worse results for the BT and TE 
treatment states than for the DP treatment state. The better results of the DP treatment state over the 
others remains in the long-run. A possible explanation is that the individuals directly placed by the 
public employment service in a regular employment could be better adapted to the needs of the labour 
market and, because of that, it is easier to match their demands for a job with the available job offers; 
Compared with the JC programmes only the PEP treatment state participants perform worse. The 
relative position of the JC programmes remains the same. In the long-run, only the BT treatment state 
seems to perform better if we compared it with the differences in the register unemployment rates 
closer to the beginning of participation and all the treatment states have similar effects if we compared 
with the opposite moment in time before participation; 
Compared with the TE treatment state all the programmes perform worse in the short-run. The 
reasons were already presented. However in the long run they remain as the treatment state with better 
results only with the exception of the BT treatment state, only. The programmes of training seem to 
give to their participants permanent conditions to be more appealing to the labour market 
opportunities. In fact, when using the differences in the unemployment register rates for the period of 
time nearest to the beginning of participation it is clear that a participation on BT produces better 
results than a participation in another kind of active labour market programme. When using the 
differences in the unemployment register rates for periods of time more distant relating to the 
beginning of participation, the absolute better results of the BT treatment state are not so obvious and 
are quite similar to the results obtained to the TE treatment state; 
As TE programmes have an important component of training, the conclusion that training induces 
an improvement in unemployed individuals’ employability, in the long-run, is reinforced; 
We can observe the PEP treatment state has worse results for participants in active labour market 
programmes. Indeed in the short-run the results for the PEP are even worse than the results for non-
participants. Only in the long-run are the results of a PEP participation better than the non-
participation results. The same conclusion was obtained by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) who admit that 
the additional amount of human capital obtained in these kinds of programmes is too small to 
compensate for the initial effects due to a reduced job search 
Finally it is important to note that in the long-run all the treatment states’ effects in the 
unemployment registers converge to the same relative values. This conclusion could indicate some sort 
of time dilution of the average treatment effects on the treated. 
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Table 1: Number of Observations and Pre-Treatment Characteristics 
VARIABLES (%) NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
Number of Individuals 
(%) 
147548 
(85.65) 
5414 
(3.14) 
13581 
(7.88) 
1686 
(0.98) 
2550 
(1.48) 
1484 
(0.86) 
Sex (Men) 40.08 34.97 41.67 21.00 22.94 23.99 
Age (Absolute value) 37.44 30.59 40.79 28.66 36.99 32.13 
Persons at charge (yes) 47.58 42.93 49.91 33.63 60.00 52.63 
Geographic location       
     Norte 40.12 21.33 60.56 36.60 30.28 22.71 
     Centro 11.50 35.30 9.82 26.99 20.94 15.50 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 40.04 23.68 26.03 23.07 27.41 43.26 
     Alentejo 5.29 4.71 1.84 7.59 17.37 16.11 
     Algarve 3.05 14.98 1.75 5.75 4.00 2.43 
Educational level       
     None 6.43 3.86 7.08 0.83 9.10 2.16 
     Primary (4 years) 34.07 23.68 41.30 17.97 36.16 19.95 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 
years) 34.70 44.79 31.44 27.34 35.77 54.72 
     Secondary (12 years) 16.09 21.70 13.08 21.83 14.90 20.01 
     Superior (15 or more years) 8.72 5.97 7.11 32.03 4.08 3.17 
Previous occupational group       
     - None 11.24 17.64 8.67 45.02 8.98 13.34 
     - Management 1.43 0.35 1.23 0.53 0.39 0.20 
     - Scientific specialist 3.79 2.07 4.15 3.20 2.35 2.02 
     - Technical worker 6.78 4.17 7.63 2.85 3.80 4.25 
     - Administrative worker 13.22 10.79 13.70 8.96 14.00 13.88 
     - Seller 15.52 20.04 12.96 12.34 16.63 21.63 
     - Farmer 4.60 3.36 3.70 3.74 8.63 5.26 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 14.87 11.95 18.28 6.94 10.71 11.12 
     - Machine’s operator 9.64 8.52 11.43 2.37 6.71 6.13 
     - No-qualified worker 18.92 21.11 18.25 14.06 27.80 22.17 
First employment (yes) 11.24 17.66 8.70 45.02 8.98 13.48 
Re-application at IEFP (yes) 48.95 62.10 40.00 54.09 60.12 62.00 
Reasons for unemployment 
register       
     - End of formal education 9.95 15.87 7.14 38.14 5.96 12.33 
     - Dismissal 38.39 25.38 48.47 16.07 32.04 26.48 
     - End of temporary 
occupation 34.74 41.98 31.23 19.87 39.73 36.93 
     - Re-application 2.81 5.84 2.49 10.14 5.77 7.35 
     - Other 14.11 10.94 10.68 15.78 16.51 16.91 
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Table 2a): The Determinants of Participation on DP programmes comparing with the remaining ones 
DP (comparing with) VARIABLES NP JC TE PEP BT 
Sex -0.058 
(***) 
(0.032) 
0.106 (**) 
(0.045) 
0.548 (*) 
(0.076) 
0.685 (*) 
(0.065) 
0.511 (*) 
(0.076) 
Age -0.051 
(*) 
(0.002) 
-0.083 (*) 
(0.002) 
-0.017 (*) 
(0.005) 
-0.053 (*) 
(0.003) 
-0.026 (*) 
(0.004) 
Persons at charge (yes) 0.046 (0.033) 
0.032 
(0.045) 
-0.239 (*) 
(0.082) 
-0.238 (*) 
(0.059) 
-0.250 (*) 
(0.073) 
Geographic location      
     Norte -2.202 
(*) 
(0.052) 
-3.409 (*) 
(0.092) 
-1.284 (*) 
(0.134) 
-2.022 (*) 
(0.126) 
-1.932 (*) 
(0.188) 
     Centro -0.477 
(*) 
(0.048) 
-0.966 (*) 
(0.093) 
-0.301 (**) 
(0.134) 
-1.052 (*) 
(0.124) 
-1.032 (*) 
(0.189) 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo -1.992 
(*) 
(0.050) 
-2.207 (*) 
(0.091) 
-0.786 (*) 
(0.135) 
-1.609 (*) 
(0.123) 
-2.438 (*) 
(0.181) 
     Alentejo -1.744 
(*) 
(0.077) 
-1.355 (*) 
(0.133) 
-1.203 (*) 
(0.171) 
-2.860 (*) 
(0.143) 
-3.147 (*) 
(0.200) 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level      
  None 0.579 
(*) 
(0.105) 
0.670 (*) 
(0.143) 
3.590 (*) 
(0.310) 
-0.382 (***) 
(0.204) 
0.481 
(0.297) 
  Primary (4 years) 0.549 
(*) 
(0.080) 
0.627 (*) 
(0.113) 
2.172 (*) 
(0.142) 
-0.243 
(0.177) 
-0.280 
(0.223) 
  Compulsory Secondary (9 years) 0.520 
(*) 
(0.073) 
0.460 (*) 
(0.102) 
2.138 (*) 
(0.115) 
-0.207 
(0.167) 
-1.007 (*) 
(0.207) 
  Secondary (12 years) 0.552 
(*) 
(0.072) 
0.497 (*) 
(0.101) 
1.726 (*) 
(0.108) 
-0.132 
(0.165) 
-0.744 (*) 
(0.206) 
  Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group      
     - None -0.031 (0.565) 
1.330 (***) 
(0.784) 
-0.206 
(0.877) 
-0.314 
(1.429) 
1.224 
(0.970) 
     - Management -0.886 
(*) 
(0.238) 
-1.231 (*) 
(0.280) 
0.114 
(0.474) 
-0.251 
(0.440) 
0.597 
(0.683) 
     - Scientific specialist -0.491 
(*) 
(0.116) 
-1.136 (*) 
(0.152) 
0.907 (*) 
(0.219) 
-0.529 (**) 
(0.229) 
-0.539 (**) 
(0.280) 
     - Technical worker -0.275 
(*) 
(0.080) 
-0.586 (*) 
(0.106) 
0.545 (*) 
(0.201) 
-0.011 
(0.152) 
-0.004 
(0.176) 
     - Administrative worker -0.285 
(*) 
(0.057) 
-0.561 (*) 
(0.079) 
0.230 (***) 
(0.137) 
-0.364 (*) 
(0.103) 
-0.168 
(0.120) 
     - Seller -0.143 
(*) 
(0.046) 
-0.159 (**) 
(0.068) 
0.155 
(0.112) 
0.211 (**) 
(0.084) 
0.056 
(0.099) 
     - Farmer -0.436 
(*) 
(0.084) 
-0.486 (*) 
(0.115) 
-0.414 (**) 
(0.177) 
0.074 
(0.131) 
0.045) 
(0.174) 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 0.013  (0.053) 
-0.161 (**) 
(0.071) 
0.181 
(0.130) 
0.360 (*) 
(0.096) 
0.142 
(0.116) 
     - Machine’s operator 0.044 (0.059) 
-0.115 
(0.081) 
0.783 (*) 
(0.187) 
0.400 (*) 
(0.113) 
0.256 (**) 
(0.141) 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment (yes) -0.131 (0.565) 
-1.785 (**) 
(0.783) 
-0.058 
(0.874) 
0.230 
(1.427) 
-1.032 
(0.967) 
Re-application at IEFP (yes) 0.342 
(*) 
(0.031) 
0.641 (*) 
(0.043) 
0.117 (***) 
(0.069) 
0.165 (*) 
(0.058) 
0.121 (**) 
(0.068) 
Reasons for unemployment register     
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     - Dismissal -0.128 (0.080) 
-0.372 (*) 
(0.115) 
0.511 (*) 
(0.143) 
-0.739 (*) 
(0.151) 
0.049 
(0.158) 
     - End of temporary occupation -0.058 (0.077) 
-0.298 (*) 
(0.113) 
0.729 (*) 
(0.138) 
-0.726 (*) 
(0.148) 
0.095 
(0.154) 
     - Re-application 0.354 
(*) 
(0.087) 
0.336 (**) 
(0.132) 
-0.050 
(0.142) 
-0.613 (*) 
(0.166) 
-0.283 
(0.174) 
     - Other -0.073 (0.077) 
0.085 
(0.111) 
0.005 
(0.130) 
-0.838 (*) 
(0.143) 
-0.242 
(0.152) 
Constant -0.523 
(*) 
(0.122) 
3.902 (*) 
(0.185) 
0.145 
(0.246) 
4.728 (*) 
(0.262) 
4.502 (*) 
(0.333) 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2b): The Determinants of Participation on JC programmes comparing with the remaining ones 
JC (comparing with) VARIABLES NP JC TE PEP 
Sex -0.073 
(*) 
0.020 
0.447 (*) 
0.074 
0.583 (*) 
0.057 
0.464 (*) 
0.074 
Age 0.024 
(*) 
0.001 
0.062 (*) 
0.004 
0.031 (*) 
0.003 
0.051 (*) 
0.004 
Persons at charge (yes) -0.015 0.019 
-0.225 (*) 
0.077 
-0.320 (*) 
0.051 
-0.232 (*) 
0.068 
Geographic location     
     Norte 0.948 
(*) 
0.069 
1.635 (*) 
0.153 
1.575 (*) 
0.132 
1.328 (*) 
0.200 
     Centro 0.392 
(*) 
0.073 
0.276 (***) 
0.160 
0.085 
0.137 
-0.160 
0.206 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 0.050 0.070 
0.936 (*) 
0.157 
0.718 (*) 
0.133 
-0.326 (**) 
0.197 
     Alentejo -0.475 
(*) 
0.094 
-0.056 
0.196 
-1.289 (*) 
0.152 
-1.777 (*) 
0.219 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level     
     None -0.053 0.063 
2.866 (*) 
0.300 
-0.672 (*) 
0.178 
0.061 
0.280 
     Primary (4 years) 0.090 
(***) 
0.052 
1.431 (*) 
0.131 
-0.472 (*) 
0.158 
-0.552 (*) 
0.208 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 years) 0.155 
(*) 
0.048 
1.455 (*) 
0.106 
-0.399 (*) 
0.148 
-1.261 (*) 
0.192 
     Secondary (12 years) 0.119 
(**) 
0.048 
1.090 (*) 
0.098 
-0.466 (*) 
0.148 
-1.120 (*) 
0.191 
     Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group     
     - None -0.551 0.464 
-0.283 
1.122 
-17.188 
. 
0.381 
0.957 
     - Management 0.021 0.088 
1.022 (*) 
0.377 
1.224 (*) 
0.346 
1.877 (*) 
0.599 
     - Scientific specialist 0.450 
(*) 
0.062 
1.709 (*) 
0.193 
0.858 (*) 
0.190 
0.531 (**) 
0.242 
     - Technical worker 0.229 
(*) 
0.043 
0.988 (*) 
0.186 
0.687 (*) 
0.130 
0.630 (*) 
0.161 
     - Administrative worker 0.163 
(*) 
0.035 
0.640 (*) 
0.128 
0.321 (*) 
0.086 
0.449 (*) 
0.111 
     - Seller 0.017 0.034 
0.325 (*) 
0.112 
0.387 (*) 
0.078 
0.202 (**) 
0.098 
     - Farmer 0.073 0.052 
-0.004 
0.169 
0.356 (*) 
0.111 
0.534 (*) 
0.168 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 0.113 
(*) 
0.031 
0.384 (*) 
0.125 
0.593 (*) 
0.084 
0.365 (*) 
0.112 
     - Machine’s operator 0.042 0.035 
0.872 (*) 
0.183 
0.538 (*) 
0.100 
0.500 (*) 
0.137 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment (yes) 0.892 
(**) 
0.464 
0.423 
1.119 
17.567 (*) 
0.131 
0.382 
0.949 
Re-application at IEFP (yes) -0.230 
(*) 
0.020 
-0.545 (*) 
0.067 
-0.388 (*) 
0.051 
-0.456 (*) 
0.066 
Reasons for unemployment register    
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     - Dismissal 0.300 
(*) 
0.067 
0.779 (*) 
0.143 
-0.476 (*) 
0.151 
0.550 (*) 
0.168 
     - End of temporary occupation 0.328 
(*) 
0.067 
0.884 (*) 
0.139 
-0.567 (*) 
0.149 
0.479 (*) 
0.164 
     - Re-application 0.252 
(*) 
0.081 
-0.540 (*) 
0.146 
-0.896 (*) 
0.172 
-0.537 (*) 
0.189 
     - Other -0.113 
(**) 
0.064 
-0.305 (**) 
0.130 
-1.001 (*) 
0.144 
-0.273 (***) 
0.162 
Constant -4.158 
(*) 
0.107 
-2.855 (*) 
0.245 
0.435 (***) 
0.240 
0.508 
0.321 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 2c): The Determinants of Participation on TE, PEP and BT comparing with the remaining ones 
 TE (comparing with) PEP (comparing with) 
BT 
(comparing 
with) 
VARIABLES NP PEP BT NP BT NP 
Sex -0.558 
(*) 
0.063 
-0.103 
0.100 
-0.300 (*) 
0.107 
-0.643 (*) 
0.050 
-0.163 (***) 
0.088 
-0.590 (*) 
0.065 
Age -0.039 
(*) 
0.004 
-0.037 (*) 
0.005 
-0.014 (**) 
0.006 
-0.009 (*) 
0.002 
0.031 (*) 
0.004 
-0.029 (*) 
0.003 
Persons at charge (yes) 0.212 
(*) 
0.067 
-0.129 
0.088 
-0.060 
0.100 
0.314 (*) 
0.044 
-0.010 
0.077 
0.307 (*) 
0.059 
Geographic location (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     Norte -0.935 
(*) 
0.116 
-0.221 
0.185 
-0.419 (***) 
0.229 
-0.483 (*) 
0.110 
-0.092 
0.217 
-0.273 
0.180 
     Centro -0.186 0.118 
-0.485 (**) 
0.191 
-0.664 (*) 
0.235 
0.378 (*) 
0.112 
-0.106 
0.221 
0.536 (*) 
0.183 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo -1.300 
(*) 
0.119 
-0.400 (**) 
0.187 
-1.304 (*) 
0.226 
-0.528 (*) 
0.109 
-0.922 (*) 
0.212 
0.433 (**) 
0.174 
     Alentejo -0.598 
(*) 
0.141 
-1.423 (*) 
0.212 
-1.814 (*) 
0.250 
0.924 (*) 
0.114 
-0.341 
0.223 
1.331 (*) 
0.183 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level       
  None -2.876 
(*) 
0.284 
-3.805 (*) 
0.335 
-2.985 (*) 
0.402 
0.754 (*) 
0.152 
0.745 (**) 
0.312 
0.103 
0.255 
  Primary (4 years) -1.472 
(*) 
0.105 
-2.030 (*) 
0.196 
-2.072 (*) 
0.239 
0.604 (*) 
0.136 
-0.107 
0.251 
0.682 (*) 
0.188 
Compulsory Secondary (9 years) -1.491 
(*) 
0.081 
-1.887 (*) 
0.176 
-2.717 (*) 
0.217 
0.555 (*) 
0.129 
-0.836 (*) 
0.238 
1.370 (*) 
0.174 
  Secondary (12 years) -1.075 
(*) 
0.074 
-1.685 (*) 
0.171 
-2.270 (*) 
0.212 
0.563 (*) 
0.128 
-0.629 (*) 
0.239 
1.166 (*) 
0.173 
  Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group       
     - None 0.016 0.741 
-0.220 
2.122 
2.004 
1.350 
-0.023 
1.013 
18.361 
. 
-1.570 (**) 
0.712 
     - Management -1.148 
(*) 
0.349 
0.128 
0.571 
0.746 
0.805 
-0.962 (*) 
0.325 
0.637 
0.683 
-1.611 (*) 
0.585 
     - Scientific specialist -1.253 
(*) 
0.169 
-1.137 (*) 
0.267 
-1.207 (*) 
0.330 
-0.283 (***) 
0.166 
-0.288 
0.306 
-0.220 
0.219 
     - Technical worker -0.818 
(*) 
0.168 
-0.169 
0.223 
-0.038 
0.244 
-0.455 (*) 
0.117 
0.032 
0.192 
-0.461 (*) 
0.146 
     - Administrative worker -0.470 
(*) 
0.114 
-0.349 (**) 
0.148 
-0.146 
0.161 
-0.111 
0.074 
0.168 
0.126 
-0.293 (*) 
0.096 
     - Seller -0.296 
(*) 
0.099 
0.001 
0.124 
-0.116 
0.134 
-0.339 (*) 
0.064 
-0.147 
0.109 
-0.178 (**) 
0.081 
     - Farmer 0.143 0.146 
0.252 
0.179 
0.361 (**) 
0.210 
-0.225 (*) 
0.084 
-0.030 
0.166 
-0.260 (**) 
0.132 
     - Manufacturer’s worker -0.186 0.116 
0.153 
0.143 
0.036 
0.158 
-0.392 (*) 
0.074 
-0.153 
0.129 
-0.128 
0.099 
     - Machine’s operator -0.813 
(*) 
0.173 
-0.312 
0.206 
-0.425 (***) 
0.224 
-0.425 (*) 
0.088 
-0.060 
0.158 
-0.303 (**) 
0.121 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment (yes) 0.171 0.738 
0.422 
2.121 
-1.516 
1.343 
-0.118 
1.012 
-18.057 (*) 
0.175 
1.105 
0.709 
Re-application at IEFP (yes) 0.231 
(*) 
0.055 
0.008 
0.083 
0.052 
0.090 
0.149 (*) 
0.044 
0.054 
0.076 
0.184 (*) 
0.058 
Reasons for unemployment register      
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
      Dismissal -0.502 
(*) 
0.118 
-1.337 (*) 
0.182 
-0.488 (*) 
0.190 
0.610 (*) 
0.126 
0.977 (*) 
0.185 
-0.309 (**) 
0.140 
      End of temporary occupation -0.612 
(*) 
0.114 
-1.454 (*) 
0.176 
-0.628 (*) 
0.184 
0.628 (*) 
0.124 
0.932 (*) 
0.179 
-0.269 (**) 
0.136 
      Re-application 0.774 
(*) 
0.110 
-0.575 (*) 
0.190 
-0.311 
0.201 
1.010 (*) 
0.139 
0.422 (**) 
0.203 
0.530 (*) 
0.152 
      Other 0.157 0.101 
-0.764 (*) 
0.166 
-0.230 
0.176 
0.793 (*) 
0.120 
0.700 (*) 
0.176 
0.092 
0.134 
Constant -0.781 
(*) 
0.198 
4.036 (*) 
0.325 
3.960 (*) 
0.385 
-4.532 (*) 
0.207 
-0.405 
0.378 
-4.609 (*) 
0.288 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table3: Tests for the Binomial Logit Models 
 DP (comparing with) JC (comparing with) TE (comparing with) PEP (comparing with) 
BT 
(comparing 
with) 
   
 NP JC TE PEP BT NP TE PEP BT NP PEP BT NP BT PEP 
Observations N 152962 18995 7100 7964 6898 161129 15267 16131 15065 149234 4236 3170 150098 4034 149032 
N 5414 5414 5414 5414 5414 13581 13581 13581 13581 1686 1686 1686 2550 2550 1484 TG % 3.53 28.5 76.25 67.98 78.49 8.43 88.96 84.19 90.15 1.13 39.8 53.19 1.70 63.21 1.0 
N 147548 13581 1686 2550 1484 147548 1686 2550 1484 147548 2550 1484 147548 1484 147548 CG % 96.46 71.5 23.75 32.02 21.51 91.57 11.04 15.81 9.85 98.87 60.2 46.81 98.3 36.79 99.0 
Pseudo 2R  (%) 12.39 30.82 18.15 16.17 13.4 4.09 29.08 16.87 23.65 14.17 25.42 21.16 5.49 9.5 7.04 
( )262χLR  5800.53 (0.000) 6996.3 (0.000) 1412.82 (0.000) 1615.23 (0.000) 962.57 (0.000) 3812.3 (0.000) 3085.14 (0.000) 2375.29 (0.000) 2293.2 (0.000) 2617.47 (0.000) 1447.43 (0.000) 927.19 (0.000) 1418.12 (0.000) 504.02 (0.000) 1170.63 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood -20506.03 -7853.915 -3185.384 -4185.920 -3110.372 -44678.76 -3761.52 -5853.111 -3701.14 -7926.308 -2123.719 -1727.243 -12210.90 -2401.60 -7731.650 
CPRTG (%) 67.53 75.66 72.63 69.04 66.01 64.44 78.28 73.85 76.57 65.3 65.54 63.76 63.84 62.78 70.15 
Notes: Subscripts TG and CG denote treatment and control groups, respectively. CPR is the Correction Prediction Rate for Participants 
 
Table 4: Matching Quality 
   Treatment Group 
   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
   Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
MSAB   18.91 1.64 10.02 1.14 30.29 1.27 13.95 1.64 17.03 2.79 
Pseudo-R2   12.5 0.2 4.1 0.1 14.0 0.2 5.5 0.2 7.1 0.5 NP Log-Like  
P>chi   
5866.21 
(0.000) 
30.06 
(0.265) 
3817.92 
(0.000) 
52.84 
(0.001) 
2580.09 
(0.000) 
8.95 
(0.999) 
1432.46 
(0.000) 
15.79 
(0.921) 
1182.54 
(0.000) 
18.52 
(0.856) 
MSAB 18.91 5.34   25.44 4.63 23.75 2.48 18.41 2.97 13.41 2.78 
Pseudo-R2 12.5 1.3   31.0 1.5 29.1 0.5 16.9 0.7 23.8 0.7 DP Log-Like  
P>chi 
5866.21 
(0.000) 
5174.68 
(0.000)   
7036.10 
(0.000) 
549.71 
(0.000) 
3091.85 
(0.000) 
25.32 
(0.501) 
2384.7 
(0.000) 
48.11 
(0.004) 
2303.35 
(0.000) 
27.22 
(0.398) 
MSAB 10.02 1.34 25.44 3.06   36.44 2.71 18.93 3.33 26.04 3.38 
Pseudo-R2 4,1 0.1 31.0 0.6   18.2 0.7 16.1 0.6 13.3 0.8 JC Log-Like  
P>chi 
3817.92 
(0.000) 
460.32 
(0.000) 
7036.10 
(0.000) 
90.06 
(0.000)   
1419.8 
(0.000) 
31.8 
(0.200) 
1611.15 
(0.000) 
42.82 
(0.000) 
957.78 
(0.000) 
31.28 
(0.218) 
MSAB 30.29 6.24 23.75 5.02 36.44 8.43   30.63 4.41 27.23 2.22 
Pseudo-R2 14.0 2.6 18.2 1.4 29.1 4.4   25.5 1.4 21.1 0.3 TE Log-Like  
P>chi 
2580.09 
(0.000) 
10511.49 
(0.000) 
1419.8 
(0.000) 
208.14 
(0.000) 
3091.85 
(0.000) 
1619.22 
(0.000)   
1449.89 
(0.000) 
92.19 
(0.000) 
926.4 
(0.000) 
12.83 
(0.985) 
MSAB 13.95 2.42 18.41 3.81 18.93 3.78 30.63 4.67   13.24 3.74 
Pseudo-R2 5,51 0.4 16.1 0.9 16.9 0.8 25.5 1.4   9.5 0.8 PEP Log-Like  
P>chi 
1432.46 
(0.000) 
1715.4 
(0.000) 
1611.15 
(0.000) 
134.35 
(0.000) 
2384.7 
(0.000) 
301.17 
(0.000) 
1449.89 
(0.000) 
64.17 
(0.000)   
505.01 
(0.000) 
31.53 
(0.172) 
MSAB 17.03 6.94 13.41 3.75 26.04 8.55 27.23 6.01 13.24 4.73   
Pseudo-R2 7.1 1.8 13.3 1.0 23.8 2.3 21.1 2.2 9.5 1.4   
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
BT Log-Like  
P>chi 
1182.54 
(0.000) 
7282.18 
(0.000) 
957.78 
(0.000) 
152.92 
(0.000) 
2303.35 
(0.000) 
774.77 
(0.000) 
926.4 
(0.000) 
101.25 
(0.000) 
505.01 
(0.000) 
102.08 
(0.000)   
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Table 5: Average unemployment register of matched individuals, before and after treatment 
Period   ÁTT
Mt ´
∆  Period   ÁTT
Mt
∆  
        
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  6.2% -1.1% 5.9% 7.6% 17.5% NP  -24.0% 14.2% -39.1% 21.5% -28.2%
DP -7.6%  0.7% 0.7% -1.4% 5.7% DP 28.4%  48.9% -18.6% 51.0% -3.7% 
JC -9.6% -10.9%  -6.2% -2.8% 9.9% JC -15.2% -39.5%  -51.6% 4.3% -43.8%
TE -11.2% -5.9% -8.4%  -4.6% 7.2% TE 44.9% 13.5% 67.4%  69.4% 13.8% 
PEP -7.5% -1.6% 0.8% 2.2%  9.3% PEP -22.3% -49.8% -5.6% -65.8%  -52.7%
- 1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -15.1% -10.9% -6.4% -9.0% -12.2%  
1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 26.6% 2.1% 43.1% -14.5% 54.9%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.5% -7.5% 0.2% -1.1% 12.8% NP  -12.7% 15.1% -7.0% 18.5% 2.4% 
DP -2.1%  2.5% 1.3% -4.4% 8.9% DP 17.2%  36.2% 0.8% 35.2% 14.0% 
JC -2.6% 2.7%  7.7% -3.5% 13.7% JC -13.3% -20.3%  -16.5% 4.2% -12.2%
TE -16.5% -9.1% -13.1%  -15.1% 4.1% TE 11.7% -4.6% 33.3%  29.5% 5.7% 
PEP -0.8% 0.4% 6.8% -0.1%  11.0% PEP -20.0% -29.2% -3.7% -27.3%  -19.0%
- 2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -11.6% -8.7% -7.7% -3.9% -13.9%  
2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.9% -11.1% 24.5% -7.5% 21.2%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.1% -39.4% -4.2% -12.3% -2.3% NP  -6.4% 10.5% -2.3% 12.9% 1.5% 
DP 3.2%  -21.3% -0.2% -6.6% 0.3% DP 12.8%  24.5% 0.8% 23.8% 5.2% 
JC 25.1% 14.6%  14.1% 13.1% 20.4% JC -6.8% -10.7%  -6.2% 3.8% -4.1% 
TE 3.5% -2.4% -33.3%  -6.7% -0.1% TE 3.7% -4.5% 22.1%  14.8% 0.2% 
PEP 11.6% 4.2% -10.2% 1.4%  3.9% PEP -12.5% -16.4% -3.1% -12.3%  -13.4%
- 3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 2.1% -2.9% -25.9% 1.0% -10.2%  
3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 7.1% -7.6% 14.9% -5.4% 16.0%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.7% -26.3% -6.7% -11.7% -5.1% NP  -4.6% 17.1% 1.7% 13.1% 7.0% 
DP 2.2%  -14.3% -2.0% -3.3% -1.1% DP 9.1%  25.4% 4.2% 21.5% 9.0% 
JC 17.0% 8.3%  6.2% 5.8% 9.9% JC -11.5% -8.6%  -4.1% 3.4% -2.6% 
TE 6.0% -0.3% -14.2%  -3.0% -1.5% TE 0.1% -5.3% 23.8%  12.1% 2.8% 
PEP 7.9% 2.3% -5.2% -3.0%  -1.2% PEP -17.0% -16.5% 2.0% -12.9%  -10.5%
- 4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.6% -0.1% -13.5% 1.2% -3.8%  
4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 0.8% -8.0% 15.0% -2.6% 9.0%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.2% -12.4% -4.1% -3.5% -3.6% NP  -6.6% -8.4% -8.0% -2.5% -6.6% 
DP -1.7%  -7.8% -2.0% 0.0% 0.7% DP 13.8%  5.6% 2.3% 9.8% 3.1% 
JC 6.2% 2.4%  1.7% 3.8% 3.3% JC 8.1% -2.9%  -0.6% 5.0% 0.3% 
TE 1.1% -2.5% -5.3%  -0.8% 2.1% TE 10.4% 0.4% 7.0%  6.5% 0.9% 
PEP 1.0% -1.3% -3.1% -4.2%  -3.2% PEP 1.4% -7.3% -5.2% -7.1%  -3.2% 
- 5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 0.5% -2.7% -6.7% -1.3% -3.3%  
5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 8.7% -1.7% 0.5% -3.9% 6.0%  
 
 
 
 
 19
 
Table 6: Results of the CDiD estimator - Average Treatment on the treated in terms of register 
unemployment  
Period   ÁTT
Mt
∆ - ÁTT
Mt ´
∆  (t’=t) Period   ÁTT
Mt
∆ - ÁTT
Mt ´
∆  (t’=-1) 
        
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -30.2% 15.4% -45.0% 13.9% -45.7% NP  -30.2% 15.4% -45.0% 13.9% -45.7%
DP 36.0%  48.1% -19.3% 52.4% -9.4% DP 36.0%  48.1% -19.3% 52.4% -9.4% 
JC -5.6% -28.5%  -45.4% 7.1% -53.8% JC -5.6% -28.5%  -45.4% 7.1% -53.8%
TE 56.1% 19.3% 75.8%  74.0% 6.6% TE 56.1% 19.3% 75.8%  74.0% 6.6% 
PEP -14.8% -48.1% -6.4% -68.0%  -62.0% PEP -14.8% -48.1% -6.4% -68.0%  -62.0%
 1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 41.8% 13.0% 49.6% -5.5% 67.2%  
1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 41.8% 13.0% 49.6% -5.5% 67.2%   
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -11.2% 22.6% -7.2% 19.6% -10.4% NP  -18.9% 16.3% -12.9% 10.9% -15.1%
DP 19.2%  33.7% -0.5% 39.5% 5.1% DP 24.7%  35.5% 0.2% 36.6% 8.3% 
JC -10.7% -23.0%  -24.1% 7.6% -25.8% JC -3.6% -9.4%  -10.2% 6.9% -22.1%
TE 28.3% 4.5% 46.4%  44.5% 1.7% TE 22.9% 1.3% 41.7%  34.0% -1.5% 
PEP -19.2% -29.6% -10.5% -27.2%  -30.0% PEP -12.5% -27.6% -4.5% -29.5%  -28.3%
 2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 17.6% -2.3% 32.2% -3.7% 35.1%  
2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 21.1% -0.2% 31.0% 1.4% 33.4%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.3% 49.9% 1.9% 25.2% 3.8% NP  -12.7% 11.6% -8.2% 5.2% -16.0%
DP 9.5%  45.9% 1.1% 30.4% 4.9% DP 20.3%  23.8% 0.2% 25.2% -0.5% 
JC -32.0% -25.3%  -20.3% -9.3% -24.5% JC 2.8% 0.3%  0.0% 6.6% -14.0%
TE 0.2% -2.2% 55.5%  21.6% 0.3% TE 14.9% 1.3% 30.5%  19.4% -7.0% 
PEP -24.1% -20.6% 7.1% -13.7%  -17.2% PEP -5.0% -14.8% -3.9% -14.6%  -22.7%
 3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.0% -4.8% 40.8% -6.4% 26.1%  
3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 22.3% 3.3% 21.3% 3.6% 28.2%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  1.1% 43.4% 8.4% 24.8% 12.1% NP  -10.8% 18.2% -4.2% 5.4% -10.5%
DP 7.0%  39.7% 6.2% 24.8% 10.0% DP 16.7%  24.7% 3.5% 22.9% 3.3% 
JC -28.5% -16.9%  -10.3% -2.4% -12.5% JC -1.8% 2.3%  2.1% 6.2% -12.6%
TE -5.9% -5.0% 38.0%  15.0% 4.3% TE 11.3% 0.6% 32.2%  16.6% -4.5% 
PEP -24.9% -18.8% 7.1% -9.9%  -9.3% PEP -9.5% -14.9% 1.2% -15.1%  -19.8%
 4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -4.8% -7.9% 28.4% -3.8% 12.8%  
4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 15.9% 2.8% 21.4% 6.4% 21.3%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.4% 3.9% -3.9% 0.9% -3.0% NP  -12.9% -7.3% -13.9% -10.2% -24.1%
DP 15.5%  13.5% 4.3% 9.8% 2.4% DP 21.3%  4.9% 1.6% 11.2% -2.6% 
JC 1.9% -5.3%  -2.3% 1.2% -3.0% JC 17.7% 8.0%  5.6% 7.8% -9.6% 
TE 9.3 2.8% 12.3%  7.3% -1.2% TE 21.6% 6.2% 15.4%  11.0% -6.3% 
PEP 0.5 -6.1% -2.1% -2.9%  0.1% PEP 8.9% -5.7% -5.9% -9.3%  -12.5%
 5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 8.3 1.0% 7.2% -2.5% 9.3%  
5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 23.9% 9.2% 6.9% 5.1% 18.3%  
 
 
 
 
 
